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But the news element-the information respecting current events contained in the
literary production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report ofmatters that are
ordinarily publicijuris; it is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the
framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writigs and discoveries" intended to confer upon one
who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any
period to spread the knowledge ofit. 1
In 1991, the Court held in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,2 that the Intellectual Property Clause3 of the Constitution did not empower
Congress to protect the telephone white pages. Ever since, lobbyists have been trying
to persuade Congress 'that the labor of information gatherers should instead be
protected under the Commerce Clause.4 Their European counterparts have succeeded
in getting protective legislation passed.5 Because Feist repeatedly emphasizes the
constitutional nature of the requirement that factual compilations must be "original"
in order to be protected under copyright law,6 the discussion whether Congress can
overrule Feist has focused on the nature and scope of the originality requirement 7 To
* Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia. JD., 1988, University of Chicago.
IInt'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,234 (1918) (quoting U.S. CoNsr. art.
i, § 8, ci. 8).
2 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
3 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 8 ("Congress shall have [the] Power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries9.
4 See, e.g., H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) ("Database Investment and Intellectual Property
AntipiracyAct of 1996'); HR. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998) ("Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act'); H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) ("Collections of Information Antipiracy Act').
5 Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 The Legal Protection ofDatabases, 1996 OJ.
(L 77) 20.
6 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 ("Originalityis a constitutional requirement."); Paul J. Heald, The
Vices of Originality, 1991 SuP. Cr. REv. 143, 144 (noting the seven places where the Court makes
the point).
7 See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feistv. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-68 (1992); Heald, supra
note 6.
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clarify what "overruling" Feist might mean and to judge better the constitutionality
of recent proposals to protect collections of information under the Commerce Clause,
this article describes Feist as standing for two restrictive propositions: one which
Congress may get around; one which Congress may not.
The most obvious restriction set forth in Feist is that unoriginal collections of
facts are not protectable subject matter. The Court described the arrangement and
selection of facts in the white pages as "mechanical," "routine," "practically
inevitable," an "age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition," "entirely typical,"
"garden-variety," and "obvious." 8 Such a collection of information is entitled to no
protection and may be freely duplicated and distributed. Although this holding caught
some by surprise,9 the Court's emphasis on originality has not been the main target
of lobbyists who have since sought to increase protection for collections of
information. Why? Because few collections of information are so utterly lacking in
originality that they flunk the Feist test: "the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice." 10 The requirement that a collection of
information display some originality in its selection, coordination, or arrangement is
not a huge stumbling block to information gatherers.11
Instead, it was the Court's insistence that "no author may copyright his ideas or
the facts he narrates, '12 that has become the target ofrecent legislative proposals. This
alternative holding in the case, that the free use of facts and ideas is 'he most
fundamental axiom of copyright law," 13 has provoked a call to arms from data
protection advocates. The Court reiterates the point again and again 14 in the opinion
8 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
9 See Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
telephone white pages were protected by copyright law), vacated by 499 U.S. 944 (1991), rev'd,
932 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1991).
10 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; id. at 359 (referring to the "narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually non-existent').
11 See, e.g., CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding collection of coin
values protected); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding collection of used car values protected); Key Publ'ns v. Chinatown Today Publ'g
Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding directory of Chinese businesses in New
York sufficiently original).
12 Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45.
13 Id. at 344.
14 Id. at 344 ("facts are not copyrightable"); id. at 345 ('CRural wisely concedes... that 'facts
and discoveries, of course, are not themselves subject to copyright protection."' (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 24)); id. ('uncopyrightable facts"); id. ("facts are not copyrightable"); id. at 347
('Ihe first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact... ."); id. at 347-48
("Census data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not 'original' in the
constitutional sense. The same is true of all facts...." (citation omitted)); id at 348 ("[Facts] may
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to everyperson."' (quoting Miller
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981))); id. at 350 ("Facts ... may
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and makes clear that even if a collection of facts is original in its arrangement,
coordination, or selection, the individual facts themselves may be extracted and used
without authorization. 15 This aspect of the decision makes it very difficult for a
gatherer of facts-once the collection has been made public-to prevent
appropriation of the fruit of its labor under federal copyright law.
The protectionist strategy, of course, has been to abandon the Intellectual
Property Clause as the basis for statutes proposed to restrict public access to facts. The
opinion in Feist, claim proponents of database antipiracy legislation, says nothing
about what Congress can do under the Commerce Clause, and surely the broad
modem scope of that clause permits fact gathering to be regulated as an important
incident of interstate commerce. This article, elaborating on a more ambitious
project, 16 examines the extent to which Congress can avoid the dual holdings of Feist
by exercising its Article I power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the Intellectual
Property Clause is a grant of power to Congress, the interpretation of its language to
narrow the commerce power is an argument for constraint by implication. The first
section of the article briefly summarizes the Court's jurisprudence in the area of
implied limitations on congressional power and describes the constitutional principles
likely to govern any attempt to get around Feist. Those principles are then applied to
the recentlyproposed "Collections of Information Antipiracy Act."17 The sources the
Court finds most relevant in implied constraint cases--history, the structure of the
Constitution, and its own pronouncements-suggest that Congress could rely on the
Commerce Clause to grant thin protection to unoriginal collections of information,
but is constitutionally constrained from prohibiting the extraction and use of facts
contained in a compilation, regardless of whether the compilation is original. The
article concludes with an illustration of the difficulties inherent in constitutional line-
drawing.
I. THE BIG PirCURE-G TER IMPLiED CONSTRAINTS ON CONGRESS
In recent years, the Court has been extremely active in going beyond the literal
terms of the constitutional text to establish principles that restrain the federal
legislative power. In cases like Printz v. United States,18 New York v. United States, 19
not be copyrighted.).
15 Id at 348 ('he mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of
the work may be protected.... Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication ...
id. at 350 ("raw facts maybe copied at will").
16 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, ImpliedLimits on Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1119.
17 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).
18 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not require executive branch of state
govemment to perform background checks on potential buyers of handguns).
19 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not require states to take responsibility
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Alden v. Maine,20 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,21 Railway Labor Executives'
Association v. Gibbons,22 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,23 and Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlfe,24 the Court has described and elaborated on the principles that underlie the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Bankruptcy Clause, and Article MII, in order to
imply constraints on Congress that are barely tethered to the constitutional text.
In a lengthy article, Suzanna Sherry and I have documented the sources that the
Court examines in making the complex determination whether Congress is impliedly
restrained from regulating commercial activity. 25 We applied the methodology the
Court uses in implied constraint cases to the Intellectual Property Clause26 and found
the following principles to be relevant in construing the scope of Congress's general
legislative power:
1. The Suspect Grant Principle: Scrutiny under the Intellectual Property Clause
is only triggered when Congress effects a grant of exclusive rights that imposes
monopoly-like costs on the public;
2. The Quid Pro Quo Principle: A suspect grant may only be made as part of a
bargained-for exchange with potential authors or inventors;
3. The Authorship Principle: A suspect grant must initially be made to either the
true author of a writing or to the party responsible for a new advance in the useful arts;
4. The Public Domain Principle: A suspect grant may not significantly diminish
access to the public domain.27
We found that the history and structure of the Intellectual Property Clause, the
structure of the Constitution itself, and the Court's interpretation of the clause,
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste).
20 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress maynot force an unconsenting state to defend
against a private federal suit brought in its own courts).
21 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause in a private suit brought in federal court).
22 455 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that Congress may not pass bankruptcy laws under its
Commerce Clause power that are not uniform).
23 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding that Congress maynot direct federal courts to reopen cases
that have come to a final judicial conclusion).
24 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that Congress maynot grant standing to sue in federal court
to someone who has not suffered an "injury-in-facf).
2 5 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 16. In addition to examining the structure of the
Constitution and its own pronouncements about the meaning of the text, the Court looks to English
legal history, colonial practices, state practices under the Articles of Confederation, debates at the
constitutional convention and in the state ratification conventions, reaction to early judicial
decisions, and early congressional precedent when it determines Congress is impliedly constrained
from acting. Id at Part IA-C.
2 6 Id at Part II.
27 Id. at Part l.B.6.
[Vol. 62:933
EX7RA CTION/DUPLICA TIONDICHOTOMY
strongly suggested that Congress does not have an unrestricted power to grant
exclusive property rights at the public's expense to whomever and under whatever
terms it wants.
I. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL WEIGHT AND PROTECTION FOR
COLLECrIONS OF INFORMATION
Congress has only rarely passed legislation that conflicts with the principles
elucidated above.28 Fierce interest group pressure, however, has Congress currently
contemplating a form of protection for collections of information that would be
unconstitutional.
A. The Legislation: House Bill 354
Recently proposed bills have gone far beyond attempting to eliminate the
originality requirement described in Feis. In fact, pending legislation does not even
mention the originality issue or expressly state that unoriginal collections of
information may not be copied. Instead, protection is aimed directly at preventing the
use of facts themselves. House Bill 354, for example, would impose liability on:
Any person who makes available to others, or extracts to make available to others,
all or a substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized or maintained
by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so
as to cause material harm to the primary market or related market of that other
person .... 29
The act would broadly define "collection of infornation"30 and would also
impose liability on "[a]ny person who extracts all or a substantial part of a collection
of information... so as to cause material harm to the primary market" of the
infonmation gatherer.31 The essence of the proposed wrong is not copying or creating
a substantially similar work, but rather "extracting" information or "mak[ing it]
28 In our article we were willing to conclude only that two other statutes clearly contravened
the principles underlying the Intellectual Property Clause. See id. at 1167-74 (arguing that the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (Supp. IV 1998), is unconstitutional);
id at 1178-81 (arguing that the Copyright Restoration Act, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), is unconstitutional).
29 Collections of Information AntipiracyAct, HR. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402(a) (1999).
30 ld § 1401(1) ('[C]ollection of information' means information that has been collected
and has been organized for the purpose of bringing discrete items of information together in one
place or through one source so that persons may access them.); i. § 1401(2) ('"[]nfonmation'
means facts, data, works of authorship, or any other intangible material capable of being collected
and organized in a systematic way).
31Id. § 1402(b).
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available," protection that has never been provided by copyright law either before or
after Feist.32
Consider the plight of Jane who creates a website listing the times and locations
of movies showing in twenty major cities. Several thousand potential moviegoers visit
her site every day, and therefore, advertisers are willing to pay her a monthly fee to
display their ads on her webpages. Rather than make hundreds of phone calls each
day to movie theaters to learn what is playing, she subscribes to a major newspaper
in each metropolitan area and consults the show times listed therein. Because she is
competing directly with the newspapers in their primary market, 3 under the rules
proposed by House Bill 354, Jane would be liable to each newspaper on three
different theories: for making the information "available to others," for extracting "to
make [it] available to others," and for mere extraction of information. 34 To emphasize
the breadth of the proposed regime, it seems likely that under the bill Jane could also
be liable to the theaters if instead of getting show times from newspapers, she
extracted the information telephonically from the theaters' answering machines.
Needless to say, this theory of liability is unprecedented and poses potentially
grave problems for business people who regularly consult sources like real estate
guides, airline websites, consumer goods pricing guides, credit reports, and the yellow
pages to conduct their business. The legislation would, however, seem to be within
the modem understanding of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The
question is therefore squarely raised whether Congress is impliedly prevented from
enacting House Bill 354 under the principles animating the Intellectual Property
Clause.
B. Does House Bill 354 Constitute a Suspect Grant?
After an extensive examination of the historical record,35 Professor Sherry and
I concluded that the principles underlying the Intellectual Property Clause apply not
only to legislation expressly containing the words "copyright" and "patent," but to
any grant of exclusive property rights in intangibles that imposes significant costs on
32 See Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learningfrom the Past in the Database Debate, 62
OHo ST. L.J. 879, 899 (2001); cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery... ."); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (defining "original work' in such a way as to preclude the protection
of facts).
33 H.R. 354, § 1401(3) ('"[P]rimary market' means all markets in which a product or service
which incorporates a collection of information is offered; and in which a person claiming
protection with respect to that collection of information under section 1402 derives or reasonably
expects to derive revenue, directly or indirectly.").
34 See id. § 1402(a)-(b).
3 5 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 16, at 1141-67.
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consumers (legislation that would have looked suspicious to the framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution).3 6
This is not to say, however, that House Bill 354 is necessarily a suspect grant.
First of all, the proposed rights are not absolutely exclusive. Proposed section 1403
privileges some "reasonable" (but not all) extractions for the purposes of "illustration,
explanation, example, comment, criticism, teaching, research, or analysis. 37
Individual items of information are not protected, although "the repeated or
systematic making available or extracting of individual items" is actionable.38
Independently gathering of information "by means other than extracting it" is
permitted,39 as are certain acts of verification. 40 Finally, some extracting of
information for the purposes of news reporting is allowed, although liability may
attach if the information extracted is "time sensitive and has been gathered by a news
reporting entity, and making available or extracting the information is part of a
consistent pattern engaged in for the purpose of direct competition."41
In spite of the safe harbors provided by the proposed law, it almost certainly
establishes rights that are "exclusive" in the constitutional sense. Absolute exclusivity
can hardly be the original understanding of the word used in the constitutional text.
First of all, Anglo-American law has never established totally exclusive rights in any
sort of property. Even the strongest rights in real property are tempered by rules of
eminent domain, nuisance principles, and various emergency doctrines. More
importantly, copyright law was assumed by the framers to establish "exclusive rights"
in the constitutional sense, and it has historically permitted an even wider variety of
36 It would be quite odd to construe the restrictive language of the Clause only to constrain
Congress's ability to regulate inventors and authors of new and original works. Why would the
framers have intended Congress to be limited in the kinds of rewards it could give to truly
inventive and creative people, while granting it absolute carte blanche to reward the makers of
unoriginal works or users of old technology?. A difficult drafting concern animated the framers:
how best to prevent Congress from replicating the evils visited upon the public by the Elizabethan
practice of granting monopolies in everyday products to successful courtiers and by later
restrictions on learning resulting from the printing monopoly granted to the Stationer's Company?.
It is unlikely that the framers intended for Congress to be able to avoid the reach of the clause
simply by invoking non-traditional forms of entitlement phraseology. In fact, it seems clear from
history that the framers were most worried about the granting of entitlements to unpatentable and
uncopyrightable subject matter.
37 H.R. 354, § 1403(a). "Reasonableness" is to be determined in light of five factors: (1) the
extent to which the use is noncommercial or nonprofit; (2) whether the amount extracted is
"appropriate'; (3) the good faith of the extractor, (4) whether the extraction is transformative; and







unauthorized uses than the scheme proposed in House Bill 354.42
To illustrate how copyright law is less restrictive than current proposals to
protect databases, consider section 107 of the Copyright Act,4 3 which codifies a fair
use doctrine that is more permissive than the "reasonable" uses permitted under
proposed section 1403(a) of House Bill 354. The fair use doctrine allows some
wholesale verbatim copying by competitors,44 an act not permitted under House Bill
354. In addition, unlike the proposed act, copyright law does not protect the literary
equivalent of "individual items of information," e.g. individual words and short
phrases.45 Copyright law, again, seems less restrictive in this regard than House Bill
354, since it allows the repeated use of unprotected words and short phrases without
liability, while repeated extraction of individual items of information is actionable
under the proposed law.46 As under the proposed bill, independent acts of creation
are permitted under copyright law, but as far as the news reporting privilege is
concerned, copyright law seems more liberal in the uses it allows. The proposed act
creates a limited right to the exclusive reporting of "hot news,"47 a type ofprotection
that the Court has already opined is not available under copyright law.48 Finally, the
absence of other user friendly copyright doctrines, like the idea-expression dichotomy
and the originality requirement, from House Bill 354 further demonstrates how the
rights it would establish are more exclusive than those granted by traditional
copyright law.
House Bill 354 would establish rights that are also exclusive in a purely
economic sense. As Professors Reichman and Samuelson have pointed out:
Proponents of the sui generis [information gathering] right [insist] that third parties
42 See NAONRESEARCH CouNciL, A QUESTON OF BALANCE: PRivATE RiGHrS AND THE
PUBLIC 1NTEREST IN ScIENIm c AND TECHNICAL DATABASES 9 (2000) (comparing the exclusivity
of copyright law with sui generis protection for databases); I H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir,
Database Protection at the Crossroads, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 793, 800-06 (1999).
43 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (permitting otherwise infringing uses under a
four-part test that examines the purpose and character of the unauthorized use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount taken, and the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted
work).
44 See BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (1 th
Cir. 1993) (en bane) (permitting Donnelley to copy names, addresses, and phone numbers from
the BellSouth yellow pages in order to create a competing work); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (permitting wholesale copying of computer object code in
order to discover its public domain elements for use in competing products).
45 Mathew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674,683 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Words
and short phrases such as names [and] titles... mere variations of typographic ornamentation [or]
lettering' are not copyrightable." (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1998))).
46 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1403(c) (1999).
47 Id. § 1403(f).
48 See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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always remain free to generate their own databases. But this opportunity exists only for
data that are legally available from public sources and whose cost of independent
regeneration is not prohibitively high in relation to the gains expected from the exercise.
As for proprietary data not legally available for second comers to exploit, there is no
opportunity to avoid the originator's exclusive rights to prevent extraction or re-use of
existing data. Even the most avid apologists for the E.C. Directive concede that in such
cases the investor's exclusive rights necessarily vest in the data as such.49
Because of the frequent functional impossibility of independently gathering data,
the proposed bill would give the possessor of information an unprecedented right to
control its use. This ability to control provides the mechanism by which it would
impose costs on consumers. When a single entity controls access to data, it is
elementary economics that the cost of access will rise. The combination of significant
exclusivity and the imposition of significant costs triggers scrutiny under the
principles behind the Intellectual Property Clause.
C. Is the Quid Pro Quo Requirement Met?
Although House Bill 354 would make a suspect grant of rights to information
gatherers, this alone does not make it unconstitutional. It simply means that the
legislation must comport with the principles underlying the Intellectual Property
Clause as justified by its history and the structure of the Constitution. It bears
repeating that virtually all of the costly grants of exclusive rights Congress has made
in the past are consistent with these principles and are therefore constitutional.50
Professor Sherry and I have argued that although the Constitution demands a
quid pro quo for the public when Congress makes a grant of exclusive property rights
to a private party, the grant need not be efficient As long as the public receives
something in return for the "embarrassment' '5 of the grant of exclusive rights, the
Quid Pro Quo Principle underlying the clause is satisfied. In theory, the public benefit
offered by House Bill 354 is increased incentives for the creation of collections of
information. At least one set of familiar economic assumptions suggests that the
granting of exclusive rights will provide incentives for information to be gathered.52
49 See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data, 50 VAND.
L. Ry. 51, 89 (1997).50 In addition to the obvious examples of copyright and patent law, Professor Sherry and I
have defended the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ee (1994) (allowing for exclusive rights
to be obtained to some unpatented drugs), and anti-bootlegging legislation, 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(1994) (protecting unfixed, and therefore uncopyrightable, musical performances). We would also
argue that exclusive rights granted in things like radio frequencies, fisheries, and airline mutes also
satisfy the principles we elucidate.
51 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's
description of the relationship of patent rights to the public interest).52 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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Even foes of sui generis database protection admit that legislation might possibly
stimulate the production of collections of information.53 Although serious doubts
exist whether this particular form of legislation is necessary or efficient,54 the rights
Congress is considering granting are clearly premised on the recipient creating
something new (if not necessarily original). Congress may be buying us something
we do not need, but the legislation is structured as an attempt to buy us something.
This is enough to satisfy the Quid Pro Quo Principle.
D. Is the Authorship Principle Satisfied?
Although Congress must reward the "true" author of a work (for example, it
could not announce tomorrow that all copyrights in future American novels belong
to Random House), Professor Sherry and I could find no historical evidence that the
framers of the Constitution were worried about the protection of works that lacked
what the Feist court called "originality." Although the framers were aware of the
severe damage done by the Elizabethan practice of granting monopolies to courtiers
who had done nothing inventive and granting to the Stationer's Company the sole
right to print works it did not write, we could find no criticism of early practices that
granted copyright protection to the creators of new works that lacked a significant
level of originality 55 In other words, we concluded that the authorship principle
would prevent Congress from rewarding John with a copyright on a compilation
assembled by Jane,56 but would not prevent Congress from granting Jane protection
for a compilation assembled by Jane, even if it were unoriginal in its selection or
arrangement. In other words, we believe that Congress could use the Commerce
Clause to get around one of the holdings of Feist-that unoriginal compilations of
facts are completely without protection.
E. Is the Public Domain Principle Satisfied?
Arguing that Congress may constitutionally provide thin protection for
collections of information, however, is not quite the same as asserting that it may
grant exclusive rights to the underlying facts themselves. The public domain principle
prevents Congress from significantly limiting access to two categories of items that
53 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 49, at 64-69.
54 See id.; Jane Ginsburg, The Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 152 (1997) ("Sui generis
legislation, therefore, may not be necessary to supply incentives to compile information
products").
55 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 32.
567The work for hire doctrine, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 201(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), seems
to pose this problem in the context of employees paid to create copyrighted works for their
employers. We discuss this issue in Heald & Sherry, supra note 16, at 1190-91.
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inhabit the public domain: (1) facts, ideas, scientific principles, laws of nature, and
the like; and (2) inventions and works of art whose legal term of protection has
expired.57 As Professor Sherry and I have stated earlier about both kinds of items:
The principle of an inviolable public domain is the necessary implication of the
constant emphasis in history and in precedent-and in the wording of the Clause itself-
on the requirement that grants be for a limited time .... We cannot find any evidence in
English legal history that the Crown ever asserted the power to grant exclusive rights over
such things, and if it did, such a power surely did not survive the Statute of Monopolies.
Given the suspicion with which the flmers viewed any monopoly, they certainly could
not have intended to grant Congress the power to grant exclusive rights over facts or
theorems. We have every reason to think that the framers considered both sorts of
inhabitants of the public domain equally available for any public use.58
The Court has also insisted on the inviolateness of the public domain, opining
that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available."59 If Congress cannot grant the heirs of Elias Howe exclusive rights
to sewing machine technology described in long-expired patents, surely it cannot
grant rights to the facts, ideas, or principles underlying that technology. Only very
recently, in response to intense interest group pressure, has Congress begun to
consider restricting access to facts and information through the granting of exclusive
rights.60
In order to determine whether the framers intended to give Congress the power
to prevent the mere "extraction" and "mak[ing] available" of information from
compilations of facts, we heed the Court's admonition to pay close attention to
English legal history and the state of legal doctrine at the time of the Constitutional
Convention.6 ' According to Paula Baron's very insightful article in this volume,
history suggests precisely the distinction between wholesale duplication (which may
be prohibited by Congress) and extraction (which may not be prohibited by Congress)
that this paper argues is embodied in the Intellectual Property Clause. After
examining a host of historical cases, she concludes, "The effect of the decisions in the
premodern cases was that a published work was open to legitimate use by others,
57 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 42, at 834-35 ("[No one can constitutionally oblige
all persons not to use facts or ideas that have been made available to the public").
58 Heald & Sherry, supra note 16, at 1165-66.
59 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
60 The Court recentlynoted in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,744-45 (1999), that long-term
congressional reticence is relevant in construing the meaning of the Constitution. Therefore,
Congress's refusal for two hundred years to create an extraction right bears on whether the
Intellectual Property Clause can be construed to allow such a right.
61Id. at 715-30.
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provided that the work was not essentially a republication of the original."62 She notes
that early cases protected the public domain by allowing free extraction of facts, but
not by absolutely denying protection to unoriginal collections of information. Works
of little or no originality were protected under the law, but only from wholesale
replication and republication.
The cases Baron discusses are very sensitive to the dangers of protecting
information as such. In Sayre v. Moore,63 for example, Lord Mansfield found no
liability when "the defendant had taken the body of his sea charts from the plaintiff's
work, but had made many alterations and improvements to it."64 Other early cases
involving the fair abridgement doctrine-which allowed second comers far greater
liberty to borrow than the modem fair use doctrine does--express a similar reticence
to provide a cause of action for mere extraction.65 This comports with Justice Story's
early understanding that copyright law did not give the author the right to prevent a
translation of his work:
[The author's] exclusive property in the creation of his mind, cannot be vested in the
author as abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the
language in which he has clothed them When he has sold his book, the only property
which he reserves to himself; or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to
multiply in copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes
of another the ideas intended to be conveyed.66
It is unlikely that the framers' views on the freedom to extract information were
substantially different from their contemporaries' (as evidenced by the fact that the
inclusion of the Intellectual Property Clause in the final draft of the Constitution was
accomplished without debate or dissenting vote).67
The relevant evidence suggests that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
would have been appalled by legislation denying the public the right to extract or
make available facts contained in a published collection of information. English law
for at least fifty years before the Constitutional Convention, and American law for at
least two hundred years following it, consistently denied authors the right to prevent
the mere extraction of facts they collected. In accordance with the Public Domain
62 Baron, supra note 32, at 925.
63 Sayre v. Moore, sitting after Hil. 1785, at Guildhall, cor. Lord Mansfield Ci., discussed
in Caryv. Longnan I East, 358,361, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139(b) (1801).
64 Baron, supra note 32, at 925.
65 See Dodsleyv. Kinnersley, 1 Arnb. 403,27 Eng. Rep. 270 (1761); Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk.
141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740).
66 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201,206-07 (C.CZED. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (holding that
German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin not infringing), quoted in Baron, supra note 32, at 919.




Principle, Congress may protect a collection of information from wholesale
replication for resale, but it may not protect facts from mere extraction. 68 Congress
therefore cannot use the Commerce Clause to get around the holding in Feist that
facts per se may not be protected.
F. An Illustration: BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing, Inc.
Although it is easy to state the proposition that Congress may prevent the
duplication of a collection of information, but may not forbid the mere extraction of
facts, the line between duplication and extraction will be difficult to draw in actual
cases. After all, a massive extraction (technically short of exact copying) followed by
republication looks a lot like the sort of behavior copyright law has traditionally
prevented. This paper will not attempt to identify precisely when over-extraction and
republication should be treated like illegal copying intended to generate a
substantially similar work. Instead, BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v.
Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.,69 is provided as a clear example of one place
where the Constitution draws a line between activity Congress can and cannot
prevent
In BellSouth, Donnelley decided to compete with BellSouth in the market for
yellow pages directories in the Miami area. It obtained a copy of the BellSouth Miami
yellow pages and gave it to a data entry company who "created a computer database
containing the name, address, and telephone number of the subscribers [from which]
Donnelley printed lead sheets, listing information for each subscriber, to be used to
contact business telephone subscribers to sell advertisements and listings in the
Donnelley directory."70 Donnelley then used this information to compile its own
competing directory. Donnelley conceded that BellSouth had a valid compilation
copyright on its product71 but argued that it did not engage in the wholesale
republication of BellSouth's work. The court found that "Donnelley did not
copy ... the textual or graphic material from the advertisements in the BAPCO
directory, the positioning of these advertisements, the typeface, or the textual material
68 Another pending bill seems more consistent with this reasoning. See Consumer and
Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, HR. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
It is unlawful for any person or entity, by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce or communications, to sell or distribute to the public a database that--(1) is a duplicate
of another database that was collected and organized by another person or entity, and (2) is sold
or distributed in commerce in competition with that other database.
Id § 102.
69 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
70 Id. at 1439.
7 1 Id.
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included by BAPCO to assist the user... [or] the page by page arrangement or
appearance of its competitor's directory in creating its own work" 72 The Eleventh
Circuit found that Donnelly had not violated federal copyright law, while affirming
prior precedent that photocopying and selling the BellSouth yellow pages would have
constituted an infringement 73
The opinion illustrates the distinction that this article argues is of constitutional
significance. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the duplication and resale of
compilations of facts is wrongful, but permitted the extraction and use of facts found
in a compilation to create a new competing work As Baron demonstrates in her
article, this distinction has a long historical pedigree, dating back before the
ratification of the Constitution. This distinction, embodied in the Public Domain
Principle, must be observed by Congress, even when it attempts to regulate pursuant
to its commerce power. It is a distinction that would be violated were Congress to
pass House Bill 354 or any other protection for collections of information that
premises liability on mere extraction or use. Although the line-drawing will often be
difficult, the distinction should operate much like the venerable idea/expression
dichotomy, which permits'the extraction of ideas from a copyrighted work, but does
not permit the copying of the particular expression of those ideas.74 The problem
addressed in idea/expression cases parallels that found in the extraction/duplication
cases-how to allow free use of the public domain elements embodied in a work
while protecting the work as a whole from copying.
G. Two Problems Lurking
One recent case and one older case raise more difficult issues of line-drawing
under the public domain principle.
1. Creative Facts?
The Ninth Circuit recently held in CDN, Inc. v. Kapes75 that individual facts
brought into being as a result of creative choices may be protected under copyright
law. In CDN, a newsletter published a compilation of wholesale coin values for a
wide variety of different kinds of coins. Some of the wholesale values announced by
CDN were used by Kapes in the process of calculating different retail values for the
same coins posted on his website. In a decision that does not address the issue of
72 Id at 1445.
73 Id. (citing S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801
(11 th Cir. 1985)).
74 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that idea of accounting system could not
be protected, but narrative description of system in book form was protected by copyright law); 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (codifying that ideas may not be protected).
75 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
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infiingement, the court held that the individual prices for each coin reflected creative
judgments and could be protected even after FeiSt.76 Interestingly, the court does not
address the issue whether the compilation as a whole exhibited originality as to the
selection of the coins priced or the arrangement of the prices in the list.
Had the case been brought in the Eleventh Circuit, the originality of the coin
prices would have been irrelevant because Kapes did not copy and republish CDN's
coin prices, but rather used them to create a new work (a different retail price list).
The Ninth Circuit; however, may be willing to rule that the use of even a single
"original 77 coin price would constitute an infringement. Such a possibility is worth
thinking about Could the Ninth Circuit (or Congress via House Bill 35478) define a
new type of "fact;" one that is not in the public domain because it was the sole
creation of its owner? Imagine an investment banker who spends days calculating a
figure for the value of a target corporation's good will.79 One could argue that he is
the "creator" of his unique figure in a sense that the telephone company is not when
it reports the numbers of its customers in a directory. In other words, should we draw
a distinction between people who gather information and those who generate unique
figures from their own independent research,80 especially when the second sort of
figures constitute personal opinions of value?
Although making the distinction is tempting, the relevant legal history provides
no support for an exception for "creative facts." In one of the most well-known pre-
Convention cases, Sayre v. Moore,81 Lord Mansfield found that substantial
borrowing from existing copyrighted sea charts was permissible. Charts are
quintessentially factual, yet they are very creative works that demand substantial
independent labor and judgment to construct At the same historical moment as
Sayre, the fair abridgement doctrine permitted substantial extraction from works far
76 Id. at 1260.
77 Even if a single datum could be original for the purposes ofFeist, CDN's prices are poor
candidates for special status. CDN did not rely exclusively on primary research to arrive at a
wholesale price, but like Kapes used information generated by others. Id "CDN's process to arrive
at wholesale prices begins with examining the major coin publications to find relevant retail price
information. ... CDN also reviews the online networks for the bid and ask prices posted by
dealers." Id.
78 Multiple extractions of single bits of data would be actionable under the bill. H.R. 354,
106th Cong. § 1403(c) (1999).
7 9 For a sense of how difficult and creative this work is, see GORDON SMITH, TRADEMARK
VALUATION (1997); Paul Heald, Money Damages for Corrective Advertising: An Economic
Analysis, 55 U. CI. L. RE v. 629 (1988).
801 would not include the NBA or the NFL in this category, sports leagues generate data, e.g.
scores, merely as a by-product of their primary business activity.
81 Sayre v. Moore, sitting after Hil. 1785, at Guildhall, cor. Lord Mansfield C.L, discussed
in Cary v. Longman 1 East, 358, 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139(b) (1801).
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more creative than maps. These, and other cases discussed in Baron's article,82
suggest that the framers' notion of what constituted the public domain was quite
expansive, perhaps even more expansive than ours today. Although the investment
banker mentioned above can make a more appealing claim to the fruits of his labor
than can the phone company, there is little historical evidence to suggest that the
framers empowered Congress to treat them differently. The investment banker must
rely on trade secret law.
2. A Hot News Exception?
An exception based on the holding in International News Service v. Associated
Press83 (iNS) is easier to justify. In INS, the Court upheld a very brief injunction
(measured in hours) preventing Intemational News Service from taking facts reported
by the Associated Press and using them in its own stories. The injunction was
narrowly tailored to preserve only the time-sensitive value ofthe facts as news and not
to establish a significant property right in the facts themselves (as the Court notes in
the quote that begins this article). International News was pernitted under the ruling
to extract the facts as soon as they were reported by the Associated Press, but it was
required to delay several hours before reporting them in its own publications. The
public and other commercial entities could treat the reported facts as entering the
public domain as soon as they were reported. Even the strongest dissenter in the case,
Justice Brandeis, thought that Congress had the power to provide such limited
protection to news gatherers.84
It is difficult to see how the decision in INS makes significant inroads into the
public domain.85 The rule facilitates the prompt reporting of data to the public. In
fact, it only protects data that has been made widely available for unrestricted public
use. The category of users who are restricted from using data is very small, and the
restriction is very temporary.86 The protection provided for hot news is perhaps the
only defensible section in House Bill 354, which as a whole is designed to provide
near absolute control over data to private parties who have no obligation to ever make
their information useful or accessible to the public.
82 See Baron, supra note 32.
83 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
84 Id. at 256. The basis of the Court's decision was federal common law of unfair
competition. Brandeis thought the Court should leave to Congress the decision whether news
gatherers needed to be protected. Id. at 266-67.
85 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 49, at 139-45 (arguing the INS model is
preferable to the model enacted in the European database directive).
86 Id at 143-44 (noting, with approval, that a historian could feel free to write a book using




BlL CONCLUSION: A USEFuL ANALOGY
Whether intellectual property scholars have traditionally talked about it in these
terms or not, the idea/expression dichotomy makes a distinction of constitutional
significance.87 Although the line between unprotectable ideas and protectable
expression is notoriously difficult to draw, courts step into the breach time and again
in order to give effect to the Public Domain Principle underlying the doctrine. The
doctrine ultimately prevents Congress from giving private parties the right to control
ideas. If Congress insists on enacting unprecedented and historically anomalous
legislation granting private parties the right to control facts that they gather, then the
courts will be called upon to develop an analogous doctrine recognizing an
extraction/duplication dichotomy. It too will be fuzzy at its edges and occasionally
flustrating to apply, but courts have historically shown a willingness and ability to
enforce this distinction. What Congress and the courts must remember is that the
distinction is of constitutional significance.
87 See M.B. NIMR& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 1.10 (1998).
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